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In July 2012, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) imposed severe 
sanctions on The Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) athletics program 
related to allegations of sexual abuse occurring in Penn State athletics facilities. 
Sanctions included a $60 million fine, a four-year postseason ban for the Penn 
State football team, a significant reduction in athletics scholarships, and a five-
year probationary period (Consent Decree, 2012). These punitive actions were 
designed in part to “change the culture that allowed this activity to occur and 
realign it in a sustainable fashion with the expected norms and values of intercol-
legiate athletics” (Consent Decree, 2012, p. 4). The NCAA concluded that the 
situation at Penn State demonstrated “an unprecedented failure of institutional 
integrity leading to a culture in which a football program was held in higher 
esteem than the values of the institution, the values of the NCAA, the values of 
higher education, and most disturbingly the values of human decency” (Consent 
Decree, 2012, p. 4).
Reactions to the penalties were mixed among those associated with the uni-
versity. Rodney Erickson, then President at Penn State, stated that the university 
accepted the NCAA penalties and corrective actions. Erickson explained that Penn 
State:
must create a culture in which people are not afraid to speak up, management is 
not compartmentalized, [and] all are expected to demonstrate the highest ethical 
standards… [w]e continue to recognize the important role that intercollegiate 
athletics provides for our student athletes and the wider University community 
as we strive to appropriately balance academic and athletic accomplishments 
(Erickson Statement, 2012).
However, some Penn State stakeholders did not support the NCAA sanc-
tions against the university. For example, shortly after the NCAA announced the 
sanctions, members of the Penn State Board of Trustees as well as the Governor 
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of Pennsylvania challenged the validity and enforceability of the Consent Decree 
and corresponding sanctions (Notice of Appeal, 2012; Corbett v. NCAA, 2013).
At the time of publication of this essay, litigation is ongoing with respect to how 
and where the $60 million in fine money will be used. In addition, in September 
2014 the NCAA Executive Committee eliminated Penn State’s postseason ban and 
returned all athletics scholarships due to Penn State’s “significant progress toward 
ensuring its athletics department functions with integrity” (Hosick, 2014a; Mitchell 
Report, 2014). Then, in November 2014 the NCAA was required to release a series 
of internal e-mails between NCAA leaders during the discovery (i.e., information-
gathering) phase of the above-mentioned lawsuit related to the $60 million fine 
(Corman v. NCAA, 2014). Several of these e-mails indicate that senior NCAA 
officials questioned the NCAA’s jurisdiction (i.e., authority) to impose the sanctions 
against Penn State. For example, former NCAA Vice President of Enforcement 
Julie Roe Lach characterized the overall NCAA approach as a “bluff” to pressure 
Penn State to accept the sanctions. Roe Lach acknowledged the NCAA “could 
try to assert jurisdiction on this issue and may be successful but it’d be a stretch” 
(personal communication, July 14, 2012). Roe Lach’s e-mail was in response to 
questions posed by her colleague Kevin Lennon, NCAA Vice President of Academic 
and Membership Affairs. Lennon wrote “I know we are banking on the fact [that 
the] school is so embarrassed they will do anything, but I am not sure about that . 
. . This will force the jurisdictional issue [and] we really don’t have a great answer 
to that one” (personal communication, July 14, 2012).
The NCAA responded to the release of the e-mails with the following justi-
fication and rationale:
Debate and thorough consideration is central in any organization, and that 
clearly is reflected in the selectively released emails. The national office staff 
routinely provides information and counsel to the membership on tough issues. 
The NCAA carefully examined its authority and responsibility to act (NCAA 
Press Release, 2014).
Penn State also issued a statement regarding the NCAA e-mails, in which 
current Penn State President Eric Barron and Chairman of the Board of Trustees 
Keith Masser stated:
We find it deeply disturbing that NCAA officials in leadership positions would 
consider bluffing one of their member institutions, Penn State, to accept sanc-
tions outside of their normal investigative and enforcement process. We are 
considering our options. It is important to understand, however, that Penn 
State is in the midst of a number of legal and civil cases associated with these 
matters (Penn State Press Release, 2014).
Another Look at the Consent Decree and Its Impact
Given this background, it is useful to revisit the July 2012 Consent Decree in which 
the NCAA focused on the lack of institutional integrity at Penn State as well as the 
need for Penn State to change its culture to realign the university athletics program 
with the norms and values of intercollegiate athletics. The flawed communication 
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and enforcement process throughout the Penn State situation is only one example 
of numerous recent situations involving the NCAA that have resulted in widespread 
criticism about the institutional integrity, culture, and values of the NCAA.
For example, in 2013 the NCAA uncovered an issue of improper conduct 
within its internal enforcement program that occurred during an investigation of the 
University of Miami athletics program (NCAA, 2013). The NCAA hired a law firm 
to conduct an external review of the NCAA’s own internal enforcement program. 
An extensive report by the law firm concluded that the NCAA enforcement staff 
“had paid a source’s attorney to insert herself into an ongoing bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and to use its subpoena power to compel depositions from uncooperative 
witnesses” (Wainstein et al., 2013). The authors of the report recognized that this 
incident “raised understandable doubts in the minds of many about the management, 
integrity and effectiveness of the NCAA’s Enforcement operations” (Wainstein et 
al., 2013). NCAA President Mark Emmert addressed this situation: “To say the 
least, I am angered and saddened by this situation. Trust and credibility are essential 
to our regulatory tasks. My intent is to ensure our investigatory functions operate 
with integrity and are fair and consistent with our member schools, athletics staff 
and most importantly our student-athletes” (NCAA, 2013).
The Penn State and University of Miami situations have called into question the 
credibility, accountability and sustainability of the NCAA, and have created some 
uncertainty about the continued viability of the current college athletics model. The 
actions of NCAA leaders and the policies established by the NCAA directly impact 
the priorities of its member institutions as well as the perspectives and perceptions 
of its student-athletes. For example, member institutions in the “Power 5” NCAA 
conferences (i.e., Big Ten, Pac-12, Big 12, SEC, and ACC) have requested greater 
autonomy to make important decisions on student-athlete wellbeing issues such as 
transfer rules, length of athletic scholarships and medical insurance coverage. And, 
recent situations involving controversial—and arguably contradictory—student-
athlete suspensions related to accepting cash for autographed memorabilia (e.g., the 
Todd Gurley situation at University of Georgia) and athletic departments deciding 
not to renew athletic scholarships of student-athletes because NCAA rules merely 
require schools to offer one-year scholarships (for example, the James Grisom 
situation at University of California, Berkeley) have produced “role conflict” for 
student-athletes as they attempt to navigate their academic and athletic identities 
(Sack and Thiel, 1985).
The college athletics case studies highlighted above set the stage for our essay 
on current education, governance, business and legal issues within college athletics. 
This essay will build on theories of role conflict with student-athletes, synthesize 
the challenges, opportunities and disconnects involving leaders within college 
athletics, and examine current discourse related to the governance and business of 
college sport along with the impact this discourse has on student-athletes and policy 
decisions. Finally, our essay will offer practical, “real-time” solutions and articulate 
how student-athletes would benefit from a shift in the unrelenting discourse from 
hyper-commercialization (see, for example, Sperber, 1990) to innovative best prac-
tices that empower student-athletes in revenue and nonrevenue sports to optimize 
and use all the skill sets they have developed from competing in the classroom 
and in athletics. We believe this approach is beneficial to the career development 
realities that every student-athlete will face when they transition from college (see 
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Comeaux, 2013, for a discussion of innovative career-transition strategies for col-
lege athletics departments).
Student-Athlete Role Conflict
Nick Saban, head football coach at the University of Alabama, recently commented, 
“all players here want to play, and they know they can’t practice or play unless 
they do what they’re supposed to do in school.” He then added, “I hope they all 
want to go to school, but I know they all want to play . . . I can really get our play-
ers to do academically what I want them to do more easily than what I could get 
my own kids to do” (Wolverton, 2014). Role conflict occurs when people receive 
contradictory demands from varied role senders, or when the roles from one status 
conflict with those required from another (Kahn et al., 1964). As demonstrated by 
the Nick Saban quote, student-athletes may experience role conflict in terms of 
facing difficulty balancing academic and athletic identities/roles, especially when 
education is framed as a separate, secondary role that solely functions as a means 
for a student-athlete to maintain athletic eligibility.
In one of the formative empirical studies on role conflict in college athletics, 
Sack and Thiel (1985) found that student-athletes are more likely to experience role 
conflict in situations where coaches make demands on their time and energy that 
prevent them from being top students. In another leading theoretical and empiri-
cal study on student-athlete identity, Settles et al. (2002) found that “interference 
between the demands of being an athlete and the demands of being a student was 
associated with some level of distress” (p. 580). Lewis (2010) critiques the col-
lege athletics model and echoes the analyses of Sack and Thiel (1985) and Settles 
et al. (2002) that role conflict is a reality for today’s student-athlete: “Academics 
and education is a myth, a lie. In fact, academics is often competing for the time 
of athletes involved in revenue-producing athletics like football and basketball. 
Unfortunately school often comes second because the stakes are high” (p. 148).
Applying role conflict theory to the current landscape of college athletics is 
an appropriate window to view student-athlete challenges and barriers to success. 
Specific to FBS football and Division I men’s basketball, the strain on the academic, 
athletic and social identities of today’s male student-athletes is intense. Recruit-
ing, required practices and training sessions, media interviews, classes and study 
hall sessions are a few of the major constructs that student-athletes must balance 
in a world where time management is perhaps a philosophic myth with all the 
simultaneous pressures that these student-athletes face. To echo the thoughts of 
renowned sports sociologist Dr. Harry Edwards, the current experiences of many 
student-athletes who participate in football and men’s basketball (i.e., the canaries 
in the “goal mines”) reveal numerous challenges and opportunities associated with 
the current collegiate athletics model.
Current College Athletics Governance, Legal 
and Business Challenges / Opportunities
The next few years will be a pivotal time in the history of collegiate athletics. 
Several NCAA member institutions are currently dealing with serious academic 
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fraud situations. For example, an extensive report released in October 2014 con-
cluded that the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) developed and 
operated a “shadow curriculum” that offered “paper classes” (i.e., courses with no 
class meetings or faculty involvement) over a period of almost 20 years (Wainstein, 
Jay, and Kukowski, 2014, p. 3). NCAA President Mark Emmert described the facts 
detailed in the report as “shocking and deplorable” (Wolken, 2014). Within weeks 
of the academic fraud report being released, a class action lawsuit was filed against 
UNC on behalf of former football student-athletes. The complaint alleges that UNC 
“systemically funneled its football student-athletes into a ‘shadow curriculum’” 
and failed to provide its student-athletes with a legitimate education (McAdoo v. 
UNC, 2014, pp. 1–2).
In addition, the NCAA and its member conferences are currently defending 
numerous lawsuits that involve issues such as increasing economic support for 
student-athletes, guaranteeing multiyear athletics scholarships, providing enhanced 
medical insurance coverage and improving player safety protocols, classifying 
student-athletes as employees, and sharing revenue from media rights and other 
licensing deals with student-athletes. For instance, a judge recently determined 
that the NCAA must allow its member schools to offer FBS football and Division 
I men’s basketball student-athletes a share of the revenues generated from the use 
of their names, images and likenesses (e.g., media rights deal for March Madness 
basketball tournament) in addition to offering student-athletes increased economic 
support that equates to a full grant-in-aid (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA 
is appealing this decision. Another class action lawsuit is attempting to create a 
free compensation market in which athletics departments would be permitted to 
individually negotiate “remuneration” (e.g., payments/compensation beyond athletic 
scholarship) and other benefits with FBS football and Division I men’s basketball 
student-athletes (Jenkins v. NCAA, 2014).
Emmert commented that “[t]here are a couple of cases out there that are 
complete existential threats to college sports. If challengers succeed in creating a 
world where college players can be paid, it’s the end of college sports as we know 
it” (Terlep, 2014). Yes, current academic integrity scandals and legal challenges 
will likely result in changes to the NCAA governance and business model, and 
might indeed “end college sports as we know it.” But, these governance and legal 
issues will likely not end college sports but rather will simply result in increased 
economic support for student-athletes and a reshifting of priorities for the NCAA, 
some conferences and many athletics programs. It is important to note that some 
of the above-mentioned legal issues either exclusively or primarily involve only 
those student-athletes who participate in men’s basketball or football (i.e., revenue-
generating sports). The perspective and priorities of all other student-athletes who 
participate in intercollegiate athletics gets lost in this discussion. We maintain the 
NCAA is spending too much time and money on responding to governance and legal 
issues instead of investing more resources into student-athlete career development 
as well as marketing and branding the academic achievements of student-athletes.
The NCAA continues to focus on oftentimes-reactive reform efforts instead 
of focusing on truly transforming its governance structure, rules and regulations, 
and business model so that colleges and universities are able to more effectively 
prepare student-athletes both academically and professionally. Reforms are usu-
ally implemented to create an outcome that will fix a problem (for example, legal 
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challenges and perceived lack of emphasis on student-athlete academic success). 
Transforming the culture and process can prevent future problems and perhaps 
eliminate the need for reform initiatives. For example, when the NCAA recently 
reported that student-athletes who entered college in 2006 graduated at a record rate 
of 82%, Emmert explained that the NCAA is “gratified to see our reform efforts 
impact the lives of those we serve” (Hosick, 2014b). Although this is encouraging 
news on graduation rates based on an NCAA reform initiative (i.e., outcome), much 
more needs to be done to transform the student-athlete educational experience so 
that more student-athletes are prepared for life after participating in college athletics 
(i.e., culture and process; see also Cunningham, 2012).
Also, in recent months conferences such as the Big Ten and Pac-12 announced 
adoption of student-athlete reforms that will purportedly guarantee multiyear ath-
letic scholarships, allow former student-athletes to return to campus to complete 
their degree, provide enhanced medical support, and create additional rule and 
policy changes aimed at improving student-athlete wellbeing. Once again, while all 
of these reform efforts should improve the student-athlete experience, we question 
whether the conferences would be making these changes absent all of the current 
pending lawsuits facing the NCAA and its member conferences combined with 
intense public pressure from members of the media, scholars and other stakehold-
ers. We also ask whether all of the above-mentioned planned reforms should have 
already been realities.
Some of the planned conference-level reforms are arguably ambiguous and 
unclear. For instance, the Big Ten conference issued a press release explaining that 
a student-athlete’s scholarship “will neither be reduced nor cancelled provided he 
or she remains a member in good standing with the community, the university and 
the athletics department” and that “[i]f a student-athlete’s pursuit of an undergradu-
ate degree is interrupted for a bona fide reason, that student-athlete may return to 
the institution at any time to complete his or her degree with the assistance of an 
athletic scholarship” (Big Ten Conference, 2014). However, the Big Ten provides 
little guidance on what “good standing” means and what a “bona fide reason” 
entails. This new Big Ten conference policy will likely lead to confusion and 
potential future challenges by current and former student-athletes who contest the 
“good standing” and “bona fide reason” qualifiers. In addition to planned reforms 
at the conference level, the NCAA is currently in the process of redesigning its 
governance structure at the Division I level.
Planned changes include structural changes related to the size, composition and 
function of the board of directors and other NCAA decision-making groups as well 
as granting athletics programs in the “Power 5” conferences with more autonomy 
related to rules that impact student-athlete wellbeing. The Executive Summary of 
the recommended governance model proposed by the Division I Steering Com-
mittee on Governance acknowledges that:
the proposed model contains elements that range from relatively noncontro-
versial items to concepts that may be more complex…. Beyond the primarily 
structural changes proposed by the Steering Committee, it is also envisioned 
that additional process and culture changes will further enhance the division’s 
ability to meet membership needs and navigate future challenges (NCAA, 
2014, p. 5).
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The Steering Committee acknowledges that the new governance structure 
does not completely address needed process and culture changes, and that some 
components of the proposal are controversial and/or potentially overly complex 
(which may end up meaning unclear and/or unenforceable). While this proposed 
new governance model is a step in the right direction, it will not address or resolve 
many of the most pressing challenges and opportunities in college athletics.
For example, one of the three primary “unifying principles” of the new gover-
nance structure is to continue “revenue distributions as they currently exist” (NCAA, 
2014, p. 36). The NCAA distributes revenue to its member institutions based on 
three factors. The number of athletic scholarships and the number of NCAA-
sponsored sports are two factors that impact the amount of revenue an athletics 
program receives from the NCAA. The third factor, which resulted in the largest 
NCAA distribution of over $193 million in 2013–14 (i.e., 39% of total distributed 
revenue), relates to the performance of all teams in each conference in the NCAA 
Division I men’s basketball tournament over a six-year rolling period (NCAA 
Revenue Distribution Plan, 2014). One possible rationale why the NCAA revenue 
distribution formula heavily emphasizes wins in the March Madness tournament 
is that each year approximately 80–90% of all money generated by the NCAA 
is from its 14-year, $10.8 billion contract with Turner Broadcasting and CBS for 
media rights to the men’s basketball tournament (see NCAA Financials, 2013). 
Advocacy groups, such as the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, 
have examined some of the problematic incentives created by the NCAA revenue 
distribution formula, and have proposed changes to the current NCAA three-factor 
formula that would in part “prioritize educational values over winning” (Knight 
Commission, 2010, p. 15).
Several universities have recently created policies and programming that 
attempt to emphasize academics and career planning. For example, bonuses to 
coaches and the athletics director at the University of Maryland will be linked to 
student-athlete Academic Progress Rate (APR) scores. This is a start. But, a focus 
on grades and graduating (that is, meeting the minimum requirements) is different 
from a focus on the development of transferable skill sets that prepare student-
athletes for career success (Fields, 2012). The NCAA and its member institutions 
need to devote more time and financial resources toward helping student-athletes 
gain practical industry experience and developing proficiencies that are marketable 
to employers. The University of Central Florida (UCF) is an example of an athlet-
ics program that is developing innovative and practical career and professional 
development programs for current and former student-athletes.
UCF is in the process of developing its new Wayne Densch Center for Student-
Athlete Leadership. UCF Athletics also recently launched its “Varsity Knights” 
initiative. The term “Varsity Knights” refers to former UCF student-athletes who 
have earned a varsity letter. Primary functions and components of the Varsity 
Knights program include business networking, career and professional develop-
ment, mentoring, and community service. For example, current student-athletes 
will participate in “Networking Knights” with Varsity Knights and local business 
leaders, and current student-athletes will be assigned a Varsity Knight mentor. Todd 
Stansbury, UCF Vice President and Director of Athletics, explained that the goal of 
Varsity Knights is “to build relationships with business professionals in the com-
munity and help provide more opportunities and mentoring for student-athletes. 
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This will help in career development and will also allow a platform to educate our 
student-athletes about what it takes to be a business professional” (UCF Varsity 
Knights, 2014). Stansbury also understands the importance of defining athletic 
program success in part based on what student-athletes do after graduation. As 
a result, UCF is now tracking its student-athletes five years after they graduate. 
These statistics will allow UCF to make data-driven decisions with respect to future 
programming and focus areas. In a recent feature article in Pegasus, the University 
of Central Florida school magazine, Kimya Massey, Director of Academic Services 
for Student-Athletes, commented that UCF is:
way past the point of wanting our student-athletes to just get degrees. We believe 
that if you’re coming here to UCF, you’re coming for a holistic experience. 
It’s not just athletically or academically, but rather an experience that hope-
fully makes you stronger, a better person and prepared for life after college 
(Culture Shift, 2014, p. 29).
Practical Recommendations: 
Creating an “Athletes Think” Identity Model
NCAA President Mark Emmert appears to understand the importance of the student-
athlete educational experience. In an October 2014 interview, Emmert issued the 
following comment on the recent academic fraud scandal at the University of North 
Carolina: “the single most important function of a university besides safeguarding 
people is educating them. That’s why they exist. We certainly need to make sure that 
we’re not talking about just graduating or just maintaining eligibility but educating 
young men and women” (Wolken, 2014). Yet, in another October 2014 interview, 
Emmert commented on the inability of the NCAA to develop and implement new 
rules, policies and processes that would improve the student-athlete athletic and 
academic experience, as he explained that “[y]ou can’t always execute because of 
the political complexity of it” (Terlep, 2014). There is no excuse for this excuse. The 
NCAA and individual athletics programs have the ability to reduce student-athlete 
role conflict by creating practical, sustainable and meaningful changes that focus 
on the academic identity of student-athletes while also simultaneously developing 
a student-athlete’s athletic identity (see Kissinger & Miller, 2009).
The current collegiate athletics system is broken, and innovative approaches 
will be key in shifting the focus and culture of collegiate athletics. A “pay-for-play” 
model is not the best strategy or solution. In addition to potential legal and logisti-
cal obstacles related to implementing a pay-for-play model, financial obstacles 
exist—the vast majority of college athletics departments would operate at a loss if 
these departments did not receive subsidies each year in the form of student fees, 
government support, and/or institutional support. While the NCAA reported revenue 
of over $912 million, expenses of approximately $852 million, and total NCAA 
net assets of over $627 million for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2013, athletics 
department annual expenses typically exceed revenue at over 95% of all NCAA 
member institutions. For example, in 2013 “expenses exceeded generated revenue 
at all but 20 schools in the Football Bowl Subdivision. The average loss among the 
five highest-resource conferences was $2.3 million, but was much higher—$17.6 
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million—at all other FBS schools” (Burnsed, 2014; see also NCAA Division I 
Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report, 2014).
Instead of spending so much time and money defending its “collegiate model” 
(i.e., amateurism; see Southall & Staurowsky, 2013), the NCAA should focus its 
efforts on developing a true “meaningful education and career preparation as com-
pensation” model. Student-athletes should be encouraged (and perhaps required) to 
participate in a variety of experiential learning opportunities such as attending and 
presenting at industry conferences as well as participating in practical internship/
apprenticeship programs with local organizations related to each student’s area 
of career interest so that student-athletes are able to effectively leverage “access 
through athletics” into a successful professional career beyond the playing field or 
court. For example, the NCAA and its member institutions could create “academic 
performance competitions” such as entrepreneurship-based accelerator programs 
that would provide startup funding for viable business concepts developed by 
student-athletes. Other practical initiatives include recognizing student-athlete aca-
demic success with a helmet sticker or jersey patch (see, for example, the culturally 
relevant initiative at Arizona State University for a best practices model) as well as 
developing an interactive website/forum where current and former student-athletes 
are able to discuss and collaborate on academic and career-related items.
Dr. John Gerdy’s ideas from the late 1990s could guide us in the right direction 
of creating a culture of intellectual recognition and career engagement in addition 
to athletic prowess with the ultimate goal of reducing the potential for role conflict. 
The following is one of the practical initiatives proposed by Gerdy (1997) related 
to emphasizing academic excellence of student-athletes:
Perhaps higher education leaders could also negotiate for increased influence 
in the selection and training of game announcers to ensure that they have some 
understanding of the goals and mission of higher education, and not solely 
the dynamics of the forward pass or jump shot. ‘Player of the Game’ features 
should be eliminated in favor of segments that highlight student-athletes’ 
accomplishments off the field (p. 117).
Collaboration by all stakeholders will be key as we work together to create a 
new “athletes think®” model in college sport.
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